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Abstract: Problem statement: In this study, we address the security needs in online communications, 
specifically in the e-health domain. We focus on how to provide different security strengths to different 
types of communications in e-health, where each communication transmits different types of information 
with different levels of sensitivity. Approach: The Multi-Agent System (MAS) approach is used to 
develop an agent-based system that can cater for distributed processes. We use the agents’ characteristics 
such as autonomous, interactive, extendible and mobile to handle the security processes for users in 
different environments and devices. We integrate different types of encryption algorithms with different 
security strengths in order to provide different security needs. Results: We present our security model 
called MAgSeM that consists of eight agents, which are skilled to complete its goal as well as the overall 
system goals autonomously. Conclusion: We conclude that MAgSeM security model is suitable not only 
for the e-health domain, but also other domains that practices online communications. 
 
Key words: Multi-agent system, security, cryptography protocols, e-health 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Nowadays, the emergence of computer 
applications that support online communications has a 
remarkable impact on how businesses are carried out. 
For example, e-services, which are services that are 
delivered via the Internet, to provide online services to 
consumers (Douligeris and Serpanos, 2007). Applications 
of e-services can be seen in e-health, Internet banking, 
retailing and electronic auctions. However, these 
applications also bring about security issues and the needs 
for reliable and robust security technologies to cater for 
security threats. These threats take advantage of computer 
systems vulnerability to cause damage to the systems.  
 In e-health, services are delivered online through 
the Internet such as via e-mail, web applications and 
videoconferencing (Liu et al., 2008). This clearly shows 
that sensitive information is delivered online, which 
motivates users to protect their privacy when doing 
online transactions (online communication will 
hereafter be referred to as online communications). 
Current security technologies such as Secure Socket 
Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) (Dierks and 
Allen, 1999), Secure Shell (SSH, 2003), IPSecurity 
(RFCs 2401-2411 and RFC 2451 for IPSec), or Virtual 
Private Network or VPN (Pardoe and Snyder, 2005) are 
undoubtedly robust and secure to be used as a security 
measure to secure online communications. Table 1 
summarizes these technologies, which are based on the 
Transmission Control Protocol and the Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) model.  
 In general, each technology offers a list of 
available encryption algorithms that are used to encrypt 
messages in transit during the communication sessions. 
However, these technologies do not cater for different 
types of communication needs in an organization. For 
example, consider that a company uses SSL for its 
secure communications. If the company needs to 
change the security strength of the SSL channel (the 
security strengths indicate the key lengths of the 
ciphers) to be stronger or weaker, it cannot be flexibly 
provided to the organization. The person in charge, for 
instance the Security Administrator, needs to 
reconfigure the systems to change the security setting.  
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Table 1: Summary of security technologies 
Security Mechanisms 
technology provided 
SSL/TLS Protect the transport layer  
 Provide authentication, digital signature and 
 encryption to the message in transit using a 
 collection of algorithms in the negotiated cipher suite. 
SSH Protect the transport layer 
 Provide authentication, data integrity and 
 digital signature. Data encryption is provided 
 during SSH session, that exchange a symmetric key. 
IPSec Protect the Internet layer 
 Provide authentication, data integrity, authentication 
 of origin and anti replay protection. Data confidentiality 
 is  provided using symmetric key algorithms. 
VPN VPNs provides various tunnelling protocols such  
 as authentication, data encryption,  
 data integrity and digital signature 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Example of a network in company X 
 
Communication scenario: Suppose that company X 
needs different security levels of protections to secure 
different kinds of communications. Consider that the 
company has distributed employees, business partners 
and customers (as described in Fig. 1). Different users 
that are involved with the company have different goals 
and purposes when communicating with other users. 
There is a need within the company, that for each 
communication, different security mechanisms are 
required so that only the most sensitive information can 
be secured with the highest level of security 
mechanisms, medium sensitive information can be 
secured using medium level of security mechanisms 
and low sensitive information can be secured using low 
level of security mechanisms. 
 For example, a Top Management might want to 
send two different messages to two different users (1) a 
message containing a secret about business strategic 
plan to another user in the Top Management level; (2) a 
technical problem in his/her personal computer to a user 
in the ICT Department. If considering the company’s 
need to secure the message according to the sensitivity 
of the message, these two different messages require 
two different sensitivity levels.  
 The first message can be considered as the most 
sensitive and the other is low sensitive. These two 
messages must be secured differently, the first with the 
highest level of security mechanisms and the second 
with low level of security mechanisms.  
 The need for stronger or weaker security strengths 
can be found in information classification standard, 
such as in ISO17799, 2007 that portrays Top Secret, 
Highly Confidential, Proprietary, Internal Use Only and 
Public Document. We can also see information 
classifications in EO12958 1995 SIGS, 2001, which 
classify information into Top Secret, Secret, 
Confidential and Restricted. For each and every 
classification, different level of security protection is 
needed for different types of information with different 
levels of sensitivity. 
 We are motivated to find the best way to secure 
different types of communications that transmit these 
different types of information, in such a way that it 
could provide different types of security strengths to the 
communications. If we investigate current security 
technologies, such as listed in Table 1, they cannot 
satisfy the requirement, because of the limitation they 
have on the configuration setting. They only allow all 
communication sessions to be secured with the same 
security strength. In other words, current technologies 
do not cater for the following requirements: 
 
• Provide different security strengths to secure 
different types of communications 
• Provide an automated and a flexible way for the 
system to cater for all kinds of users’ needs without 
reconfiguring the system and 
• Provide mechanisms to handle security for two 
communication users in different environments, 
such as PC to PDA communications. 
 
METERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Research materials: 
Security mechanisms in MLC: We have proposed the 
Multilayer communication approach (or MLC) in 
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(Sulaiman et al., 2007). The purpose of the MLC model 
is to develop a flexible and secure communications 
system for domains like e-health. MLC classifies 
communication in e-health into five layers namely 
extremely sensitive, highly sensitive, medium sensitive, 
low sensitive and no sensitive. This classification is 
based on the different sensitivity of the information 
being exchanged during communications.  
 MLC provides three types of security mechanisms 
that are data security, channel security and both data 
and channel security. In data security, cryptography 
protocols such as encryption and decryption, hash 
message, as well as digital signature are used. In channel 
security, SSL is used to provide secure channel. For both 
data and channel security, cryptography protocols are 
imposed on the data and then transmitted over SSL.  
 
Communication layers: For simplicity purposes, users 
that are involved in the communication in e-health are 
identified as Doctor, Patient, Nurse, Social Worker 
(SW), Paramedic, System Coordinator (SC) and System 
Administrator (SA). 
 Examples of communications includes a doctor at a 
hospital communicates with another doctor at another 
hospital; a patient or SW at home communicates with a 
doctor at the hospital; or a paramedic at a location of an 
accident communicates with SC at the hospital. The 
paramedic and SC work together, where information 
regarding a patient is sent by the paramedic using a 
PDA/smart phone and received by SC in the hospital 
for further action, such as preparing for a medical team 
while waiting for the patient to arrive at the hospital.  
 For a communication between two users say, 
Doctor and Nurse, the layer of communication or 
com_layer is identified. com_layer refers to the five 
layers of communications in the MLC model, which 
determines the security mechanisms and symmetric key 
lengths that will be applied to the information in a 
particular communication session. com_layer can be 
determined by using a default layer value (L0), assigned 
as the following: 
 
• Patient, Doctor and Nurse, L0: Layer 1 
• Paramedic and System Coordinator, L0: Layer 2 
• Social Worker, L0: Layer 3 
• System Administrator, L0: Layer 4.  
 
 L0 is assigned based on the sensitivity of the data 
each user may carry. Smaller L0 is assigned to users 
that communicate extremely sensitive information, 
while a bigger value of L0 is assigned to users that 
communicate low sensitive information. The rules to 
determine com_layer for a communication between a 
sender and a recipient are as follows: 
• If sender’s L0 and recipient’s are the same, then 
com_layer for that communication will be the 
recipient’s L0 
• If sender’s L0 is greater than the recipient’s, then 
com_layer for that communication is the sender’s L0 
• If sender’s L0 is smaller than the recipient’s, then 
com_layer for that communication is the 
recipient’s L0 
 
 Therefore, com_layer can be identified by 
comparing the sender’s and the recipient’s L0s. The one 
with a larger value will be chosen as com_layer. For 
example, in Nurse (L0 = 1) and SW (L0 = 3) 
communication, the com_layer will be Layer 3. If both 
L0s are the same (in Doctor and Patient communication, 
where L0=1), then, the com_layer is equal to 1. After 
com_layer is identified, the security mechanisms for the 
communication can be determined, that is, whether the 
communication needs data security, or channel security, 
or both data and channel security. The com_layer is 
associated with the length of the symmetric key 
encryption algorithms (Sulaiman et al., 2011): 
 
• Layer 1: key length =193-bit key and longer  
• Layer 2: key length = 129-bit to 192-bit key (for 
wireless: 80-bit to 192-bit key) 
• Layer 3: key length = 112-bit to128-bit key 
• Layer 4: key length = 80 to less than 111-bit of key 
 
 We can see that the Layer 1’s key lengths are 
longer than the other layers, so that the strongest 
security can be given to the communication. 
 
MLC specification: The MLC Specification stores the 
security specifications, which describes the information 
about the symmetric key encryption. MLC specification 
is stored as a tuple containing four parameters: 
 
<Algorithm, lengths, mode, padding> 
 
 Algorithm, lengths, mode and padding describe 
the types of algorithms for the symmetric key, the 
lengths of the key, encryption modes and encryption 
padding respectively.  
 Figure 2 gives an example of a set of MLC 
specifications. Examples of available algorithms that 
can currently be used are AES 256-bit and 192-bit 
representing Layer 1, Triple-DES 168-bit for Layer 2, 
AES 128-bit, Twofish 128-bit, TEA 128-bit and 
Blowfish 112-bit represents Layer 3 and Blowfish 80-
bit represents Layer 4.  
 The encryption mode is cipher-block chaining mode 
(CBC) and padded with PKCS7 padding. The encryption 
algorithm is selected randomly after com_layer has 
been calculated as part of the communication process. 
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Fig. 2: An example of MLC specifications 
 
Any standard algorithms can be added to this 
specification. The method of selecting the algorithms 
presented here is more flexible compared to the method 
in the existing technologies such as presented in Table 1. 
 
Multiagent-based approach: We are interested to use 
the multi-agent characteristics to cater for the security 
processes, so that MLC could be implemented as a 
multi-agent system. The characteristics of the agents 
include the following. 
 Agents can represent a user to handle security 
processes automatically. The security processes are 
done stage by stage and distributed because they needs 
resources from remote recipient such as permission to 
send a message as well as the private key of the 
recipient to perform cryptography protocols (this will 
be described later on). 
 The autonomy and interactive characteristics 
allows agents with different capabilities to secure the 
data, which involve interacting with the user/sender, 
organizing the information obtained from the user, 
listening to any connection from other users (recipients) 
and applying cryptography protocols. Agents have the 
ability to interact, coordinate and cooperate with each 
other in order to achieve the overall goal of the system 
(which is to send secure message to the recipients). 
 The extensible property of the agent allows it to be 
added or instantiated when a new communication is 
needed and deleted when the communication has 
ended. Thus, the agents can handle multiple 
communications at once.  
 The mobility characteristic of the agent can be used 
to carry the message across the network, which allows 
the agent to carry out tasks on behalf of the user/sender.  
From this discussion, we have found the required agent 
characteristics, namely autonomous, mobility, 
extendible and interactive. 
Autonomous: The autonomy of an agent is a 
characteristic that allows agents to do the assigned tasks 
independently. Each agent has its own behaviour(s). 
The agent’s actions or tasks assigned to the agent are 
performed from within the behaviours. 
Communications and coordination between agents, 
which are performed in order to complete a task, are 
done and handled through behaviours. When an agent is 
executed, it automatically performs its behaviour 
without being invoked by any external entity. 
 Agents are considered active. They have control on 
their actions as they have goals and rules. They know 
when to act, or update their states. Autonomous is 
performed by not providing the agent with call-backs 
function to its own object reference to other agents. 
Consequently, this will lessen any chance of other 
entities taking control of its services. Thus, control 
complexity is reduced and divided within the agents 
themselves (Bellifemine et al., 2007; Jennings, 2000). 
 
Mobility: Mobility is the ability of the agent to migrate 
or move from home platform to another platform, 
carrying its code and data. Mobile agents can be 
characterised like the following (Braun and Rossak, 
2005; Singh, 1998):  
 
• Mobile agents are used in the wide-area and 
heterogeneous networks where there is no 
reliability on the connection or the security of the 
network 
• The migration of the agents is initiated by the agent 
(or programmer) 
• The agents migrate to access resources only 
available at the remote hosts 
 
Extendible: Extendible focuses on adding or removing 
capabilities or skills of an agent to an existing system. 
Debenham (1999) defines extensibility as “the abilities 
to easily add new functionality to a system, or 
upgrading any existing functionality”. To be extensible, 
MAS should be capable of performing new functionality 
that it is currently does not able to perform. A new agent 
representing a new system’s functionality can be added 
to the system, without reconfiguring the whole system. In 
this research, we focus on the extensible functionalities, 
where the agent can be specialized or skilled and added 
to the existing system.  
 
Interactive: The key element for multi-agent 
interaction and social organization is communication. 
Agents are able to cooperate and coordinate their 
actions to execute tasks through communications. 
Agent Communication Language (ACL) enables an 
agent to exchange data and information with other 
agents. FIPA-ACL and KQML (Bradshaw, 1997) are 
the most commonly used agent  language. 
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 KQML provides message formatting and message-
handling standard to support knowledge sharing among 
agents in a run-time environment (Bradshaw, 1997). 
FIPA-ACL, which is based on the speech act theory, 
suggest that agent’s actions are represented by messages 
(Bellifemine et al., 2007). Both ACLs have a distinct 
communication protocols known as performative, or 
communication act. This protocol uses speech act 
language such as request, send, accept, rejec.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Organizing the agents: We use Organizational 
Structure proposed by Nwana et al. (1996) as our 
coordination techniques for our multi-agent system. 
Organizational structure specifies a set of long-term 
responsibilities and interaction patterns for the 
agents (Durfee et al., 1987). The long-term 
responsibilities describe agent’s functionality that 
guarantees long-term consistency and satisfactory 
result of the whole system performance. 
 While agents perform their responsibilities, there 
are agents that depend on other agent’s partial solutions 
to perform their own responsibilities, which require to 
be informed of the other agent’s partial solutions so that 
they can take further actions. An agent does not need 
any information that does not affect their actions. 
Therefore, apart from specifying the responsibilities, 
the organizational structure also decides particular 
agents that are interested or required a partial solution. 
When any exchanging process of partial solutions of 
one agent occurs, it will give effect to the other agent’s 
actions (Luck, 2001).  
 The approach of organizational structure is to 
specify the agent’s actions or functionalities and divide 
the problem search space among the agents, in such a 
way that particular agents are assigned to specific tasks. 
For further information on organizational structure, 
readers are referred to (Huhns and Gasser, 1989; 
Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1992; Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
Identifying agents goals using organizational 
structure: We specify each agent’s actions or 
functionalities that are assigned to them for completing 
an overall goal. According to Jennings (1996), in this 
technique, the actions of agents in solving goals can be 
expressed through a classical AND/OR graph (Mahanti 
and Bagchi, 1985).  
 We identify the overall multi-agent system goal 
and the sub goals using the AND/OR graph. These 
goals represent the agent’s actions. Figure 3 and 4 show 
the AND/OR graph to illustrate the main goal (G and 
G’) and their respective sub goals.  
 
 
  
 
Fig. 3: AND/OR graph for agent’s goal G 
 
 The goal G is to “Send Secured Data to Recipient” 
while goal G’ is to “Listen to Incoming Requests”. We 
divide G into G1 to G4 and assign an agent into each 
sub goal, labelled as A1 to A4. G’ is divided into G’1 
and we assign agent A7 to G’1. These sub goals may or 
may not contain another level of sub-goals. Agents that 
are drawn with double lines indicate agents that are 
instantiated to complete certain sub goals. For example, 
A5 and A6 are instantiated by A4 in order to complete G4. 
 An ‘AND’ node can only be completed, if all of the 
immediate sub-goals are completed. For example, G4.2 
(Apply Cryptography Protocols) can only be completed if 
goals G4.2.1 to G4.2.4 are completed first. An ‘OR’ node 
can be completed by choosing either one of the sub-goals. 
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Fig. 4:AND/OR graph for the agent’ goal G’ 
 
For example, A8 may entertain a request by performing 
either G’1.1.1 (Verify plaintext), or G’1.1.2 (Sign 
token), or G’1.1.3 (Process received data), provided 
that all conditions are met.  
 Both graphs illustrate the interdependencies 
between goals and data/resources, which are needed to 
solve the primitive goals. The solid arrows indicate 
interdependencies between goals and data/resources, 
which is drawn in bold lines. 
 The graphs also illustrate interdependencies 
between goals. The dotted arrows indicate 
interdependencies between G4.2 and G4.3, which are 
Apply Cryptography Protocols and Send Data. In an 
organizational structure, it is important for each agent 
to report each result of the sub-goals, or report that it 
has finished its goal to the other agents that need the 
result, so that other agents could use the results to 
determine their next actions. For example, A5 must 
report its end result to A6 and then only A6 can send 
the secured data to the recipient’s side. 
 
Organizing the Agents: The agents are renamed with 
meaningful names as follows: 
 
A1: Interface Agent (IA): interacts and obtains data 
from the user authenticate a user to enter the 
system and acquire data from the user 
A2: Data Organizer Agent (DOA): organizes the data 
received from the user such as the message and the 
recipient’s address 
A3: Multi-tasking Agent (MTA): makes a request to 
send a message to other users and keeps track of 
undelivered messages 
A4: Crypto Agent (cA): provides all necessary 
information and parameters for the security 
processes 
A5: SetUp Agent (SUA): applies cryptography 
protocols  
A6: Mobile Agent (MA): carries secured data to the 
Recipient’s platform 
A7: Communication Listener Agent (CLA): listens to 
any incoming request  
A8: Receiver Agent (RA): provides verification service 
to the agents that arrive at the platform  
 
 The agents cooperate with each other to perform 
security processes, by sending reports and messages (or 
partial results) to the other agents in order to achieve 
the overall goal. A report indicates that an agent has 
finished its task. The partial results are integrated in the 
process of generating an overall goal. 
 
Proposed Multi-Agent based Security Model 
(MAgSeM): We proposed a multi-agent architecture 
called MAgSeM to cater for security processes for 
online communication in e-health, such as in Patient (as 
sender) to Doctor (as recipient) communication. The 
previous agents are integrated with another two agents, 
which are Server Agent (SvA): resides at the server’s 
side to manage the authentication process and other 
requests from agents; and Decrypt Agent (DA): 
instantiated by MA to perform the decryption process at 
the recipient’s side. 
 Fig. 5 shows the proposed multi-agent system 
called MAgSeM. The dotted lines show instantiated 
agents. At the sender’s side, IA sends the ID, password 
and IP address of the sender to SvA to be authenticated 
(assumption is made that the certificates of all users 
have been exchanged beforehand. A security 
administrator in an organization, such as a hospital 
could be responsible for managing certification 
exchanges). SvA authenticates the user and if the 
sender is authorized, it sends the authentication result 
(valid/invalid) as well as a list of IP addresses of other 
users that have exchanged certificates with the sender. 
 Then, IA gets the data and address of the 
recipient(s) from the sender and gives it to DOA. DOA 
organizes the data into a file or plaintext and gives both 
plaintext and the address to MTA. The Secure 
Communication Layer is where the security processes 
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are performed. At this layer, MTA sends a request to 
send a message to the intended recipient(s). cA prepares 
all necessary information for the security processes and 
determines the appropriate layer for the communication 
as described in MLC. SUA is instantiated by cA to 
apply the cryptography protocols. MA is instantiated by 
SUA to send the data to the recipient by migrating to 
the recipient’s host.  
 At the recipient’s side, CLA listens for any 
incoming request to send a message from MTA. CLA 
instantiates RA to entertain the incoming MA in case 
of a request. MA instantiates DA at the recipient’s 
side to perform decryption processes. At the server 
side, SvA compares the ID and password with the 
one in the database. If they are matched, SvA stores 
the IP address of the user.  
 MAgSeM supports the implementation of MLC 
and provides a rather generic architecture that can be 
used in any type of domains. The agents use the 
autonomous, extensible, interactive and mobile 
characteristics and are able to coordinate and cooperate 
with each other to achieve the overall system goal.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5: The proposed MAgSeM 
 Each agent is skilled to perform certain specific 
tasks. An agent can be extended or instantiated by using 
the extensibility characteristic when its skill is required 
for the system to achieve the overall goal. For example, 
SUA is instantiated only when it is time to apply the 
desired cryptography protocols. DA is instantiated only 
when the condition is met to decrypt messages.  
 Agents in MAgSeM handle and automate the 
security processes with minimal intervention from the 
user. A mobile agent is used to carry secure data to the 
recipient. Mobile agents are suitable for a situation 
where the agent has only partial resources at the home 
platform and the rest of the resources are located at the 
recipient side. In our case, the mobile agent requires the 
private key of the recipient, which is only available at 
the recipient’s host to decrypt the data. Mobile agents 
are robust, in a sense that if the destination platform is 
shut down while the agent is still there, the agent can 
take necessary actions such as migrating back or 
terminating its activities (Lange and Mitsuru, 1999). It 
can send a notice to the home platform about its 
situation and terminate if required. 
 Control over Data by Sender: MAgSeM focuses on 
a control mechanism on how a sender can securely 
transfer data to a recipient while maintaining control 
over the data. The ‘maintaining control’ over the data 
can be described as: 
 
• If the message carried by the sender’s mobile agent 
is seized by an attacker, the attacker still cannot 
recover the plaintext 
• The recipient or any other third party does not need 
to know the details of the decryption processes to 
recover the plaintext 
 
 One way for the sender to gain control over the 
data, is to keep part of the requirements for the 
decryption process a secret, such as part of the agent’s 
code, or parameters used for decryption. A symmetric 
key, K is used to encrypt the plaintext. This key and the 
information about the key (which is stored in the MLC 
specification), are kept with the sender until the mobile 
agent which has moved to the recipient’s host needs it.  
 MAgSeM implements the control mechanism using 
the mobility and the extensibility of the agents. Two 
symmetric keys (K1 and K2) are used in the security 
processes. A sender agent uses K1 to encrypt plaintext 
to get a ciphertext. K2 is used to encrypt DA’s code, 
which has the ability to decrypt the ciphertext.  
 A token, which is an encrypted random number, is 
carried by the mobile agent to the recipient’s host. It is 
used as a ‘phone home’ mechanism (Grimley and 
Monroe, 1999), where the agent sends the token back to 
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the sender. This is a way for the agent to tell the sender 
that it wants the information kept at the sender’s side 
for the decryption processes.  
 
Different agent’s actions: We discuss the agent 
actions for MAgSeM’s system. The following symbols 
will be used throughout this chapter to explain the 
security processes: 
 
• Public and Private keys of the recipient: (pubKr, 
privKr)  
• Public and Private keys of the sender: (pubKs, 
privKs) 
• Symmetric keys: K1, K2  
• Disposable secret and public key: (Ks, Kp) 
• Plaintext: P 
• Hash of P: H(P) 
• Ciphertext: C 
• Signature: S 
• Agent’s code: Cd 
• Hash of Cd: H(Cd) 
• A random number Rand 
• Token: T 
• The information extracted from the MLC 
Specification: mlc 
 
 An agent’s code, which has the functionality to 
decrypt a ciphertext, is labelled as Cd, in which, when 
executed, Cd becomes DA.  
 
Interface Agent (IA): IA provides Graphical User 
Interfaces (GUI) for authentication and message editing 
purposes. IA takes the user ID and password for 
authentication. When the user has finished writing a 
message, IA: 
 
• Retrieves the recipient(s) names and the message 
from the interface 
• Sends INFORM and both information to DOA and 
waits its confirmation of received message 
• Waits for INFORM from MTA and displays a 
message to user regarding success or failure of the 
sent message 
 
Data Organizer Agent (DOA): When DOA receives a 
message from IA, it does the following: 
 
• Splits the message into Recipient(s) and the actual 
message 
• Saves the actual message into a file (plaintext), 
which will later be retrieved by MTA 
• Sends INFORM and the recipient(s) name to MTA 
and then to IA 
Multi-tasking Agent (MTA): MTA receives the 
recipient(s) name from DOA and for each recipient, it 
does the handshaking process: 
 
• Sends REQUEST to each recipient’s CLA to send 
a message 
• CLA will send an INFORM containing ‘Agree’ (or 
‘Reject’), a name of available RA and the agreed 
mlc for K2, which is shared between the sender 
and recipient 
• Sends INFORM, with the recipients’ address, RA’s 
name and mlc specification for K2 to cA  
• Any undelivered message notification will be 
handled  
• Sends INFORM to DOA and then to IA regarding 
success or failure of sending the message 
 
Communication Listener Agent (CLA): CLA listens 
to any incoming request to send message from other 
MTAs. When a new request is received: 
 
• CLA checks the number of available RAs used at 
the moment. If the numbers of RAs are less than 
the maximum numbers allowed at a time (a 
maximum number of connections at a time can be 
set to control CPU processing power), then RA 
accepts the request with an ‘Agree’ answer, 
otherwise a ‘Reject’ 
• Calculates com_layer for the communication and 
determine mlc from the MLC specification for K2. 
For Layer 2 communication on mobile device, the 
sender agent who makes the request will tell CLA, 
that it is using mobile device in the ACL message 
• Creates an instance of RA, which will be 
responsible for entertaining any incoming MA 
carrying the sender’s message 
• Sends INFORM with RA’s name and mlc to the 
MTA that made the request if the answer is 
‘Agree’, otherwise sends ‘Reject’ 
 
 Crypto Agent (cA): When cA receives a message 
from MTA, it will do the following: 
 
• Determines com_layer between sender and 
recipient based on their L0s 
• Based on com_layer, cA chooses mlc for K1 from 
the MLC specifications 
• creates an instance of SUA to prepare the plaintext 
using cryptography protocols 
• When creating SUA, the parameters that are passed 
to SUA are the RA’s name and address, mlcs for 
K1 and K2, storage that keeps the private key and 
the recipient’s certificate 
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• Monitors SUAs and the flow of the message, whether, 
the message is delivered properly and if not, give 
INFORM on the undelivered address to MTA 
 
SetUp Agent (SUA): SUA takes the recipient’s 
certificate and extracts pubKr. Then, it calculates 
com_layer for the sender and recipient’s 
communication to obtain mlc. Then it: 
 
• Generates two symmetric keys (K1, K2) according 
to mlc 
• Encrypts P with K1 to produce a ciphertext C = 
E(P)K1 
• Generates Rand and encrypts it with K1 to produce 
T that will be carried by MA. K1 is kept until T is 
received. T = E(Rand)K1 
• Generates disposable (Ks, Kp). After T is received, 
Ks is used to encrypt the information that is kept 
for decryption processes. The corresponding Kp 
will be embedded in Cd and sent to the recipient’s 
host to for decryption. The generation of (Kp, Ks) 
is one time per communication session. They will 
be disposed once the communication session is 
over, to avoid any third party from using Kp (Kp 
can be retrieved from the Recipient’s host) in the 
next communication sessions.  
• Take Cd and create a Java archive (.jar) file 
• Signs the.jar file (Cd) with privKs to produce a 
signature, S, which is used to verify that Cd is from 
the sender. S = E(Cd)privKs 
• Encrypts Cd, S and T with K2 to produce 
Ciphercode. Ciphercode = E(Cd, S, T)K2 
• To allow only RA to retrieve K2, it is encrypted 
with pubKr together with H(Cd) to produce 
Cipherkey. Cipherkey = E(K2, H(Cd))pubKr 
• Saves C, Ciphercode and Cipherkey in a file. 
Establishes SSL connection if necessary for 
channel security. 
• Having finished preparing the message, SUA 
creates an instance of MA to carry the message to 
the recipient’s host. 
• Waits for T from MA. Once it is received, produce 
hashKey, which is the information to be given to 
MA that contains H(P), K1 and mlc. hashKey = 
E(K1,mlc,H(P))Ks 
 
Mobile Agent (MA): MA carries the message to the 
recipient’s host and there it communicates with RA.  
 
• MA sends REQUEST to process the message  
• Receives INFORM from RA indicating that both 
Cd and S are ‘Valid’/’Invalid’. If ‘Invalid’ message 
is received, INFORM SUA and terminates 
• If both are valid, MA sends REQUEST to sign T 
and sends the signed T back to SUA 
• Receives hashKey from SUA and un-jarred Cd 
• Send REQUEST to execute Cd  
• hashKey and ciphertext are passed to Cd for the 
decryption processes 
 
Receiver Agent (RA): RA will be in charged of 
communicating with MA and Cd in the process of 
decrypting a message: 
 
• Waits for any request to process messages from 
MA 
• Once received, the message is split into Ciphertext, 
Ciphercode and Cipherkey 
• Gets privKr to decrypt Cipherkey D 
(Cipherkey)privKr = K2, H(Cd) 
• Use K2 to decrypt Ciphercode D (Ciphercode) K2 
= T, S, Cd 
• Both S and Cd will be verified: 
• Validate S against Cd using the sender’s 
pubKs 
• Recalculate H(Cd) from Cd in 4 and compare 
it with H(Cd) in 3 
• If both S and H(Cd) are valid, sends INFORM to 
MA. If one or both are invalid, send a report to MA 
and abort current process. 
• Sign T, when a request is made from MA. 
• When the plaintext P and H(P) are received, 
recalculate H(P) and check if P is tampered. 
• Sends INFORM to Cd whether P is 
‘Valid’/’Invalid’  
• If P is valid, notify the recipient. 
 
Decrypt Agent (DA): Once Cd is executed, it is called 
DA: 
 
• DA decrypts hashKey using Kp D(hashKey)Kp = 
H(P), K1, mlc 
• Loads and recreates K1 with mlc to decrypt the 
ciphertext, C 
• Decrypts C to get P. D(C)K1 = P 
• Sends INFORM to RA about P and H(P), so that 
RA can recalculate the hash and validate the 
plaintext. 
• Terminates itself. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 MAgSeM uses two secret keys (K1 and K2), with 
their specifications are derived from MLC. K1 is kept 
secret at the sender’s side and by doing this; the sender 
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has the advantages of gaining control over the data 
carried by MA. A recipient or any third party does not 
need to know the details of K1. Even though an attacker 
could intercept hashKey that came from Sender Agent, 
the attacker still cannot recover the plaintext as the key 
to decrypt hashKey, which is Kp, is at the recipient’s 
host. In addition, Kp is disposable, which is created 
only once per every communication. Kp and the 
corresponding Ks will be removed once a 
communication session is terminated. 
 Another advantage for sender is that, when the 
token is received and validated, SUA knows that MA 
has been correctly executed at the recipient’s host, 
because the correct token that has been recovered 
means that MA has been given the correct resources at 
the recipient’s platform (which in this case the 
recipient’s private key). Thus, the access to the 
resources at the recipient’s host is not denied. In this 
case, RA must provide its private key to decrypt 
Cipherkey and sign T. 
 For RA on the other hand, it does not have to be 
burdened with the details of the decryption process of 
plaintext. RA is only required to provide its privKr and 
authenticate MA. It can verify that MA is indeed comes 
from the sender’s host by checking the signature and 
the integrity of the agent’s code (by verifying both S 
and H(Cd)). If both are valid, then the message and 
agent are indeed come from the trusted sender. In 
addition, it can check whether the plaintext is not 
tampered by calculating a new hash code and 
comparing it with the one received from the agent. 
 ‘INFORM’ or ‘REQUEST’ is used to send 
messages among the agent as a form of 
communications among them. A message contains 
INFORM may be the partial results, which is needed by 
other agents to advance to their next actions to 
complete the overall system goal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study we have presented the characteristics 
of MAS to develop MAgSeM. The desired 
characteristics include autonomy, mobility, extendible 
and interactive. These characteristics help in developing 
a system with less intervention from the user, where the 
security processes can be automated. MAgSeM 
employs a control mechanism that uses two secret keys 
and keeping one of them a secret a sender’s side. This 
gives the sender a form of control over the data as a 
mechanism to protect the information. We use e-health 
domain as our problem domain and we conclude that 
MAgSeM is can also be used in other domains, where 
the users are distributed. 
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